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ORIGINAL 
Foreword
	 MJLWt P fthh 
This report documents a buffet test in the National Transonic Facility carried out jointly by 
the Boeing Airplane Company and the NASA Langley Research Center. The report contains 
information developed by both Boeing and NASA personnel. The authors wish to acknowledge the 
contributions of all those personnel at Boeing and Langley who were involved in preparations for 
the test and actual conduct of the test. The excellent teamwork and dedication resulted in a highly,
 
successful test completed in a timely manner.
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Summary 
A buffet test of a commercial transport model was accomplished in the National Transonic 
Facility (NTF) at the NASA Langley Research Center. This aeroelastic test was unprecedented 
for this wind tunnel and posed a high risk to the facility. This paper presents the test results from 
a structural dynamics and aeroelastic response point of view and describes the activities required 
for the safety analysis and risk assessment. The test was conducted in the same manner as a 
flutter test and employed on-board dynamic instrumentation, real time dynamic data monitoring, 
automatic, and manual tunnel interlock systems for protecting the model. The procedures and test 
techniques employed for this test are expected to serve as the basis for future aeroelastic testing 
in the National Transonic Facility. This test program was a cooperative effort between the Boeing 
Commercial Airplane Company and the NASA Langley Research Center. 
Introduction 
In the fall of 1988, a Boeing 767 transport model was tested in the National Transonic Facility 
(NTF) at high Reynolds number (Re). When testing at Re number of 67 million/ft at Mach numbers 
of 0.75, 0.80, 0.82 and at angles-of-attack between 3 to 5 degrees, significant model vibrations were 
encountered. These oscillations appeared to be a strong function of Re number and Mach number in that these oscillations were observed at Mach 0.80 and Re number of 67 million/ft but not at 
Re number of 37 million/ft for the same Mach number. Subsequent to this test, analyses were 
performed in an attempt to understand the cause of these oscillations. Although the exact nature 
of the flow excitation, was not determined, the analyses suggested that the oscillations occurred at 
angles-of-attack where the lift curve slope breaks, indicating onset of flow separation over the wing. 
The mechanism is postulated to be a limited amplitude aeroelastic instability involving interaction 
of the rigid body roll inertia and the balance roll spring, driven by alternating flow separation and 
reattachment induced by variation of the effective angle-of-attack in rolling motion. 
In 1991, a second test of the model was undertaken in order to understand the relation between 
test variables (Mach number, Reynolds number and dynamic pressure) and model dynamics; 
develop test techniques and procedures to allow safe testing into the buffet regime; and to verify wing 
vortex generator performance. (The actual airplane is equipped with two sets of vortex generators 
near the wing mid-span.) Since the NTF does not have any protection for the fan blades and the 
stability of the model system aeroelastic (buffet) response could not be predicted with confidence, 
the re-entry test was judged to be a high risk for the facility. NASA Langley agreed to the re-entry 
contingent upon an acceptable Safety Analysis Review (SAR). 
The objectives of. this paper are to describe the analyses, tests, instrumentation, on-line 
monitoring system, tunnel interlock and test procedures that were employed for this special test 
in the NTF. Preparatory investigations as well as elements of the failure modes analysis and risk 
assessment are presented, along with the results of the measured model system aeroelastic response 
during the wind tunnel tests. The Boeing 767 buffet test is expected to serve as the benchmark for 
all future aeroelastic and/or other high risk testing in the NTF. 
SYMBOLS LIST 
A	 RMS amplitude of frequency response 
CL	 Lift coefficient 
CM	 Moment coefficient 
ft	 Foot
ft Foot 
g Acceleration of gravity 
Hz Hertz 
in. inches 
kip One thousand pounds 
ksi kips per square inch 
Kjc Measure of fracture toughness 
my Millivolt 
psf Pounds per square foot 
q Dynamic pressure 
Re Reynolds number 
a Angle of attack 
Model Description
The Boeing 767 model installed in the NTF is shown in figure 1. The model is supported 
by a swept strut sting and uses an NTF 101B force balance. The model and support structure 
is constructed of 18 nickel Maraging Steel Grade 200. This material is used extensively for NTF 
models because of its high strength and acceptable fatigue and fracture properties when exposed to a 
cryogenic environment; Typical properties at —250°F include an ultimate strength of 252 kips/in2. 
Young's modulus of 30 million lbs/in2
 and a fracture toughness Kjc of 85 ksi-in1/2. 
The .03 scale model has 48 pressure orifices, a wingspan of 56 inches, is 56 inches long and 
weighs approximately 238 pounds. The model has been previously tested in the Boeing Transonic 
Wind Tunnel and the NASA Ames Research Center 11-foot Transonic Tunnel. 
A planform view of the right wing is given in figure 2. In the figure, the locations of the, vortex 
generators (VG's) on the wing are shown. The scaled VG's were bonded to the wings and are 
extremely small, i.e. .09 in. long, .024 in. high and .004 in. thick. 
Test Approach and Run Schedule 
Prior test results showed the roll buffet (buzz) oscillations to be sensitive to Reynolds number. 
The test approach was to obtain data at various Reynolds numbers and dynamic pressures, at 
the cruise Mach number of 0.80, for the configuration with and without vortex generators. This 
approach resulted in the test program profile shown in figure 3. Initial high R number runs were 
to be made with wing vortex generators on, with the expectation that the severity of the roll buffet 
model dynamics would be reduced or eliminated. The magnitude of the primary test variables Re 
and q, would then be slowly increased as per the test profile of figure 3, and small angle-of-attack 
increments taken as indicated in the run schedule of Table I. 
Emphasis was placed on testing the model safely. Reliance was placed on special model 
dynamics instrumentation, experienced Boeing and NASA LaRC test personnel and wind tunnel 
interlocks for model/facility protection. Once confidence was established in the instrumentation, 
monitoring systems and other safeguards, the plan was to test into and (if possible) through the 
roll buffet regime. After this part of the plan was completed, the model was to be tested with and 
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without vortex generators to verify their aerodynamic performance and to complete the rest of the 
test program according to the run schedule of table 1. 
On-Board Instrumentation 
Safety requirements for testing in the NTF, dictated that special instrumentation be installed 
on the model and swept strut (sting). During the 1988 test, limited dynamic data from the force 
balance and a video of the oscillations were used for post-test analyses. Quantitative analyses 
relative to the elastic response of the wings, swept strut, and the vibration modes involved could 
not be obtained from the limited data. Therefore, for this test 3 accelerometers were installed 
in the wings. Also, the wing and swept strut were strain gaged to provide additional data. The 
additional instrumentation provided capability to monitor the rigid body, and flexible modes of 
primary interest for the model system. The wings were machined by Boeing for installation of 
miniature accelerometers which had been qualified and calibrated for cryogenic use. Appendix A 
gives a description of the accelerometers and the qualification test program that was performed to 
establish that the accelerometers would work in a cryogenic environment. 
The locations of the accelerometers are indicated in the photograph of figure 4. The most 
outboard accelerometer was located in the left wing about 5 inches from the tip. The other 
accelerometer placed in the left wing was located at the outboard flap track fairing approximately 
10 inches from the wing tip. These two accelerometers were positioned to monitor the wing bending 
modes of principal interest as well as the model rigid body roll modes. The third accelerometer was 
located in the right wing at the intersection of the engine nacelle strut with the wing (18.5 inches 
inboard from the tip). This accelerometer was used to monitor the rigid body roll modes but was 
not used for wing elastic modes response due to its location at or near node points of the two 
wing modes of interest (see section on wind-off vibration tests). The two accelerometers in the left 
wing provided redundancy for monitoring the wing bending modes. Instrumentation redundancy 
is particularly important for testing in the NTF due to the likelihood that instrumentation will 
be lost in the harsh environment. Also, model access to troubleshoot or repair instrumentation 
requires tunnel warm-up which is very costly in time and resources. 
The accelerometers were installed in insulated foam cups (see figure 5 for typical installation), 
to prevent grounding problems. The accelerometer wires were routed in existing or special channels 
(grooves) machined into the wing. Planned installation of a pressure transducer near the trailing 
edge on the left wing could not be made due to lack of sufficient space in the channels for both 
accelerometers and the transducer wires. Problems were encountered with cracking in the channel 
filler material during the initial cryogenic cycling of the model in the NTF cryogenic test chamber. 
Subsequently, a filler material consisting of Hysol EA 9309 epoxy, mixed with 100 micron carbon 
spheres on a 1:1 ratio by volume, was used without problems (see ref. 1 for information on filler 
materials). During cryo cycling of the model system in the NTF model conditioning chamber, 
the accelerometers were functionally checked by vibrating the model at various times during the 
cooldown, cold soak, and warmup cycles. 
The NTF 101B balance provided force and moment dynamic data corresponding to the six 
measured components. The dynamic data from the force balance are processed and monitored by 
the Balance Dynamic Display Unit (BDDU) and Critical Point Analyzer (CPA) (see ref. 2 for a 
description of the BDDU and CPA). 
Vibration Monitoring and Model Protection Systems 
The primary function of the vibration monitoring and model protection system was to protect 
the model against failure by limiting the static plus dynamic loads to pre-established limits. The
system was comprised of both Boeing and NASA equipment and employed equipment and test. 
techniques that are used at Boeing and at NASA LaRC for buffet and flutter testing. 
Boeing System 
The Boeing Company uses a portable monitoring and shutdown system called Dynamic 
Response Actuated Switch (DRAS) which has been used for flutter testing. for approximately 
fifteen years. DRAS has the capability to monitor 2 channels/unit of dynamic data simultaneously. 
It has provisions for automatically tripping wind tunnel interlock systems if pre-set limit levels 
(voltage output from on-board instrumentation) and vibration cycle counts are exceeded. DRAS 
uses lowpass filters for mode separation between channels. By filtering, DRAS can monitor 
4-or more different vibration modes (depending on the frequency spread) simultaneously. DRAS 
monitors time domain signals and employs a trip algorithm which automatically opens or closes a 
relay switch(es). It has provisions for setting dynamic amplitude levels (voltage output from an 
accelerometer for example), and cycle count. The cycle count provision limits trips associated with 
signal spikes and is usually set for 3 to 9 cycle counts. Lights on the DR.AS units indicate cycle 
count and trip status. 
In addition to DRAS, the Boeing Co. has developed a Wind Tunnel Monitoring System 
(WTMS) for real time dynamic monitoring. This system provides real time colorgraphic displays 
in both the time and frequency domains. This WTMS provides real time diagnostic information 
which is essential to understanding the character of the aeroelastic response in terms of vibration 
modes participation, and buildup in amplitude levels as tunnel operating parameters are varied. 
Also, energy levels and frequency changes are monitored along with other types of information 
which can be used for initiating manual interlock trips or making risk decisions during a real time 
test situation. An example of the colorgraphics display used for this test is given in figure 6. 
Examples of the WTMS colorgraphics displays used for this test are given in figures 6 and 7. In 
the figures, the time domain signal is shown at the top, with the peak values shown in the bar 
graph in the lower right hand corner as a function of elapsed time. The two displays on the left 
side of the figures are the frequency versus amplitude (indicated by volts) and the waterfall display 
which shows the amplitude in color versus time (vertical scale) and frequency. The snapshot display 
in figure 6 illustrates a roll buffet (buzz) condition where the high vibration levels are associated 
primarily with the rigid body roll mode at 20 Hz. Wing bending mode responses at 55 Hz and 
77 Hz respectively, are also present as can be seen in the spectra. Figure 7 illustrates a pitch buffet 
condition where the high vibration levels are associated primarily with the first sting bending mode 
at 10 Hz. Also, as can be observed from the figure, the rigid body rolling mode (20 Hz) vibration 
is present but at a much lower energy level. The roll and pitch plane vibrations in figures 6 and 
7 are representative of run conditions that resulted in the wind tunnel interlocks being tripped 
to rapidly unload the model. The Boeing DRAS and WTMS were used primarily to monitor the 
accelerometers placed in the wings which gives a normalized measure of the dynamic loads/stresses 
at critical (highly stressed) points in the model structure. These systems could have been used to 
monitor any of the dynamic signals. 
NASA Langley Systems 
Systems employed by NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) for monitoring and protection 
of the model system are, described in the following sections. 
Transonic Dynamics Tunnel System. Personnel from the LaRC Transonic Dynamics Tunnel 
participated in the test and used equipment and techniques that are typically employed for flutter 
testing in the Langley Transonic Dynamics Tunnel (TDT). This system consists of a Fast Fourier 
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Transform (FFT) Analyzer and an 8 channel strip chart or 0-Graph. The FFT Analyzer is used 
to monitor the frequency response of the model system and to track the RMS amplitude of the 
response for each of the vibration modes of interest as a function of tunnel test parameters. For 
this test, the inverse of the peak amplitude response (1/A) was plotted at various test points to 
measure the rate of change of the aeroelastic response and trends toward aeroelastic instability (see 
ref. 3 for a discussion of the technique). 
A strip chart recorder was used to monitor the time domain signal for indications of amplitude 
buildup and/or trends toward instability. The use of this system by an experienced test engineer 
provides the capability for interlock trip decisions (manual mode). The combined use of the FF'T 
and the time domain data from the strip chart recorder were used as a basis for aeroelastic response 
analysis and risk decisions related to test continuation, and/or changes in test variables. The TDT 
system was used to monitor the three wing accelerometers, two swept strut strain gages, and 
selected force balance channels, e.g. rolling moment, and yawing moment. 
NTF FFT Analyzer. This analyzer was used to monitor selected channels for evidence of 
fuselage/swept strut fouling, as a backup for the TDT FFT, and for post-test analysis of data from 
selected runs. In addition, the system provided the capability for immediate playback of any of the 
data channels being recorded on magnetic tape; in both the time and frequency domain. 
Balance Dynamic Display Unit (BDDU) and Critical Point Analyzer (CPA). The BDDU 
has been used in the NTF for several years to monitor the force balance dynamic loads. The system 
is described in reference 2. The BDDU monitors the six strain gage balance output channels and 
provides a visual alarm if the 100% full scale limit load is exceeded and both visual and audible 
warning if 140% of the full scale limit load is exceeded. The full scale limit load is the design 
load for the individual force or moment component. The alarm algorithm assumes that all other 
components are simultaneously loaded to 100% of full scale value. The BDDU is equipped with a 
bar type display (see figure 8) for each of the six channels and a computer graphics display screen 
which allows the operator to get snapshot hard copies of the time domain signals for all six or 
selected channels. 
The Critical Point Analyzer scales and sums each normalized signal from the BDDU to obtain 
the combined static and dynamic signals representative of the loads at pre-determined high stress 
points. The CPA display is similar to the BDDU display shown in figure 8. A two-level alarm 
similar to the BDDU is used for this system as well. The CPA was used to monitor and limit 
the loads on the NTF 101B balance. The unit was coupled to the wind tunnel interlocks which 
provided an automatic shutdown capability. In addition to preventing overload at critically stressed 
points on the balance, the CPA was used to limit model side forces and yaw moments which could 
overstress the swept strut. Both the force balance and swept strut were protected from structural 
overload by the CPA through the automatic tunnel interlock. 
Data Storage 
All dynamic data obtained from the test were recorded on a 14 track magnetic tape recorder. 
Written records of tape count as well as recorded audio were used to identify and access test 
points for post-test analyses. These taped data were very useful for post-processing analyses and 
in particular for analyzing data channels that were not always monitored real time. This magnetic 
tape is being retained in the NTF archives for future reference.
Video Monitors 
Two video monitors were located at the Dynamics Monitoring workstation and were used for 
observing the model dynamics from two different viewing angles. In a normal run situation the 
video monitors and BDDU serve as the only monitoring devices for model protection. 
One camera provided a view of a portion of the fuselage and the left wing. The other view 
was focused on the left wing tip with the model fuselage discernible in the background. In some 
cases, particularly for the pitch or stall buffet oscillations, the tunnel interlock(s) was triggered 
manually based on judgment of the dynamics test engineer observation of the dynamic motion. 
The combination of viewing the Boeing WTMS, the NASA 0-graph and FFT along with the video 
monitor provided a good real time monitoring system for model dynamics. Also, video cameras 
were used to assure that the vortex generators remained on the wing during testing. Video tapes of 
the model dynamics were made for virtually all the runs. Selected nms illustrating the roll buffet 
and pitch buffet modes of oscillation are available on VHS format. 
Monitoring System Location in Control Room 
A planview of the monitoring system layout in the NTF control room is given in figure 9. The 
Monitoring Workstation included the Boeing WTMS and DRAS systems, the NASA TDT FFT 
Analyzer and strip chart and the NTF FFT Analyzer station. A block diagram of the Monitoring 
System workstation is given in figure 10 which illustrates the data acquisition, storage, channels 
being monitored by specific equipment and associated interlock paths. As previously mentioned, 
2 additional video monitors (showing 2 different model views) plus a wind tunnel test parameters 
monitor were provided at the workstation. The NASA CPA and BDDU stations were located in 
the Test Conductor's area. The tape recorder was positioned adjacent to the monitoring systems 
workstation. 
Three manual kill buttons (switches) were located at the workstation for use by both Boeing and 
NASA personnel. Two additional kill switches were located in the vicinity of the Test Conductor's 
station. One switch was manned by the NTF Facility Manager or Facility Safety Head while the 
other switch was installed at the Test Conductor's station. A communication link was established 
between the workstation and Facility Safety Manager or Safety Head. The Dynamics workstation 
operator(s) were not in the communication loop with the test conductor and wind tunnel operators 
in order to avoid communication confusion. Communication from the workstation operator(s) to 
the Facility Manager or Safety Head on model system dynamics, tunnel parameter changes and/or 
hold conditions were relayed to the Test Conductor by the Facility Manager or Safety Head in 
charge of the test. 
Wind Tunnel Interlock System 
As previously stated, the monitoring and shutdown system schematic is given in figure 10. As 
shown in figure 10, the DRAS 1, DRAS 2, and CPA units provided automatic interlock capability 
for protection of the model structure, force balance and swept strut. Manual interlock switches 
were provided to both Boeing and NASA personnel. 
The National Transonic Facility has the capability for rapidly reducing model loads through 
the wind tunnel interlock or trip system. Prior to the Boeing 767 test the procedure for unloading 
the model was to fail-safe the Inlet Guide Vanes (IGV) upstream of the fan and to trip the drive 
system. The IGV fail-safe unloads the IGV at a rate of 18 degrees/sec which has the potential for 
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reducing the test section Mach number from 0.80 to .65 in a pproximately 2 seconds. This provides 
a very rapid reduction in dynamic pressure when operating at high Mach numbers (i.e. >0.65). 
Based on earlier tests it was clear that buffet onset was highly sensitive to change in angle-of-
attack. (Note: This is generally true for all buffet phenomena related to airfoil separated flow.) 
A special interlock was installed on the pitch system which provides an angle-of-attack reduction 
rate of approximately 3 degrees per second. 
The interlocks used for the 767 test simultaneously failsafed the IGV and brought the model 
pitch system to the home position (0 angle-of-attack). As previously mentioned, interlocks were 
set up to be tripped automatically by the DRAS and/or CPA and manual trip (kill) switches were 
provided to the dynamics test engineers. Also, system functional checks on each automatic channel 
and manual kifi switches were performed prior to each run or test series. The interlock system 
worked extremely well in rapidly unloading the model with no operational problems encountered. 
Pre-Test Dynamic Monitoring and Safety Systems Shutdown Checkout 
In preparation for the model entry into the NTF, tests were done to verify operation of 
monitoring equipment and instrumentation and to perform functional checks for the automated 
emergency shutdown interlocks. This testing included exercising the Boeing DRAS 1 unit, the CPA, 
the NASA TDT equipment and NASA NTF FFT Analyzer. This checkout provided an opportunity 
for the NASA test engineers to become familiar with the Boeing system and to simulate (to the 
degree possible) an actual run condition. The test setup is illustrated in figure 11. The test is 
described in detail in Appendix B. The approach was to conduct a forced vibration test to simulate 
model dynamics during a tunnel run, and exercise the monitoring and shutdown system. Only the 
DRAS 1 unit was available for this test. The WTMS and DRAS 2 were setup just prior to the 
actual wind tunnel test. A threaded hole was machined, by Boeing, in the outboard flap track 
fairing on the right wing to provide an attachment point for the shaker. In addition, the shaker 
was attached to the fuselage with a special threaded plug which fit into anexisting threaded hole 
in the fuselage. 
Wind-Off Vibration Tests 
To accurately determine the vibration modes that were involved in the model system aeroelastic 
response, and to set limits on vibration levels during wind tunnel testing, it was necessary to do 
a wind-off vibration test or modal survey. This test experimentally determines the model system 
natural vibration modes, frequencies and damping. This information was used to validate the 
dynamic model of the structure, to evaluate, identify and analyze the system structural mode 
frequencies during testing, and to set limit load levels associated with the vibration modes of major 
concern. These data were also used to strategically locate instrumentation (e.g. accelerometers) to 
assure that the various wing vibration modes could be properly monitored. 
The modal survey was performed on the model system after installation in the wind tunnel 
test section. The test setup is shown in figure 12 which shows the actual model, a vibration exciter 
system, and modal data acquisition system. A shaker (vibration exciter) was attached to the model 
at an outboard position on the right wing (as shown in figure 12) and also at the fuselage centerline. 
The natural vibration data were acquired by an HP 5423A Modal Analyzer System which provides 
a tabulated set of mode shapes, frequencies and damping data, and displays of the animated mode 
shapes for different views which are selectable on the machine. 
The measured mode shapes and frequencies of primary interest are illustrated in figure 13. 
Two of the mode shapes obtained from the Boeing finite element dynamic model are illustrated in 
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figures 14 and 15. Note the excellent agreement between calculated and measured frequencies for the 
roll mode and first wing bending mode. The modes of primary concern for the roll buffet response 
were the 23 Hz rigid body roll, 1st wing bending (55 Hz symmetrical) and 1st wing bending (77 Hz 
asymmetrical). Of particular concern was the potential for getting into a flutter type instability 
at the wing mode frequencies. Based on the earlier tests and analyses it was thought that the 
so-called rigid-body roll mode (the model attached to a torsional spring which is represented by 
the NTF 101B balance) was a clean 20 Hz rolling motion. However, the wind-off vibration survey 
revealed two modes that were associated with rigid body roll. For the mode at 19.5 Hz (see table II 
and figure 13), the motion is predominantly roll but also involves yawing and pitching of the model 
on the balance spring. The 23 Hz mode was a clean roll or torsional oscillation. During the wind-off 
vibration test, at a resonance frequency of 19.5 Hz it was experimentally determined that fouling or 
hard contact occurred between the model fuselage and the swept strut (see figure 4). The minimum 
measured gap between the model fuselage and swept strut was approximately .32 inches. In the 
1988 test an aerodynamic seal was installed in this gap; however for the 1991 tests, no seal was 
installed in order to simplify the testing. The fact that fouling occurred for the 19.5 Hz resonance 
forced response test suggested the likelihood that hard fouling should occur during wind on testing. 
However, the decision was made not to install the seals, to provide maximum clearance. 
Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment 
In order to establish that the Boeing-767 test was an acceptable risk for the NTF, a safety 
analysis and risk assessment was required. This assessment required a large effort on the part of 
both Boeing and NASA personnel. The risk assessment model developed for use by Boeing and 
NASA personnel in performing the safety/risk assessment, is provided in Appendix C. The analyses 
and tests that were performed to support this assessment are discussed in the following sections. 
Structural Integrity 
The Boeing 767 model was one of the first transport models designed for testing in the NTF. 
The model structural integrity and aeroelastic stability characteristics met the criteria for static 
testing in the NTF (ref. 4). However, the re-entry for high risk buffet testing required a complete 
review of the model structural integrity. In-depth dynamic loads analyses were performed to identify 
all critically loaded components, to establish acceptable dynamic load limit levels and to evaluate 
fatigue and fracture life. Previously, handbook calculations were sufficient to meet the NASA 
requirements, but in-depth analysis required a detailed finite element analysis of the wing structure. 
The control point on the structure (the most highly stressed single order failure point) was found to 
be the engine nacelle strut to wing attachment holes (wing station 9.3). This was true for the worst 
case static loads and primary vibration modes including all rigid body roll and elastic wing modes 
(see Table III). Other areas of concern included fasteners working loose and possible overstress of 
the swept strut. In table IV, the calculated stresses at the nacelle hole (with and without stress 
concentration affects) and associated wing tip deflections, for a normalized value of 100 g's measured 
at the wing tip are presented. These calculations reflect only the one particular vibration mode 
participation for each normalized load case. One significant observation from the data of table W 
is that large amplitude oscillations (5.5 inches peak to peak) for the 20 Hz roll mode could be 
tolerated at an acceptable stress level of 100.8 ksi. These results suggested that acceptable model 
oscillation amplitudes for the 20 Hz roll mode could be 5 times greater than those experienced in 
1988 with the peak stresses well within the dynamic loads allowables of reference 4. As previously 
mentioned, the 18 Nickel, 200 grade maraging steel material has an ultimate strength capability 
of '-'250 ksi at —250°F. A summary of the critical components, along with their classification and 
monitoring requirements as determined from the Boeing analysis is provided in table V. 
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The wing vibration modes were of particular interest due to the potential for wing flutter type 
oscillations at the higher frequencies (e.g. 55 Hz and 77 Hz). A detailed Boeing finite element model 
of the wing gave good definition of structural modes and resulted in a high level of confidence 
for establishing safe dynamic limit loads. All of the detailed structural analyses indicated that 
the model structure was capable of taking greater dynamic loads than the model balance could 
withstand for the 20 Hz roll mode. These results suggested that the force balance would be the 
limiting structural component for the buffet test, if the 20 Hz vibration was the predominant buffet 
mode. However, this did not turn out to be the case and is discussed in the section on "Results 
and Discussion." Rigid-body roll motion amplitudes of 5 inches (peak to peak) were not considered 
acceptable either, and reduced limits were used during the test. 
Fan Protection 
The National Transonic Facility is not equipped with catcher screen(s) to protect the fan
from either a model failure or a failure of any internal structural component in the tunnel. Most
facilities which perform dynamic and aeroelastic testing (e.g. the LaRC TDT) are equipped with

such catcher screens. Also many closed circuit wind-tunnel facilities have a full set of spare fan
blades to allow quick resumption of testing if blades are lost; the NTF did not. Subsequent to the

mishap at the NTF in January 1989 (see ref. 5), a replacement set of blades was fabricated which
in addition to other structural repairs resulted in a down time exceeding 1 year. Plans were also

approved to build a spare set of blades but these blades were not to be ready until mid to late 1991.

Catcher Screen. In preparation for the Boeing 767 test all available means for protecting the
fan and other internal components from damage due to potential model failure were investigated.
As a result of one of the many design reviews held during the design and construction phase of the
NTF, it was recommended and approved that a catcher screen assembly be designed and fabricated
for the NTF. This screen was to be located at the end of the high speed diffuser ahead of turn 1.
The catcher screen was an aluminum or steel honeycomb design supported in an egg crate type 
assembly attached to the tunnel shell. However, installing the screen for the 767 test was determined 
impractical for the following reasons: 
a) The structure was partially fabricated and the steel honeycomb material needed for completion 
had a very long delivery time (beyond 10 weeks). This could not meet the 767 test schedule. 
b) The fabricated parts and pieces would have to be inspected and the installation, fit-up, and 
tunnel checkout would further lengthen the long lead time. 
c) The installation of the screen would add significantly to the critical part count(highly stressed 
single point failure) for the tunnel. 
In the final analysis, it was determined that the screen could not be fabricated, inspected, installed 
and checked out in time to meet the test schedule. 
Debris Fence. An existing debris fence was considered for installation to reduce the risk 
associated with the test. The debris fence was designed to be installed on the downstream side of 
the turning vanes in turn 1 but had never been installed during tunnel operations. The installed 
fence would be three feet from the tunnel floor, and had very little energy absorption capability due 
to the small wire mesh type construction. Further, some of the welds in the attachment hardware 
were found to be defective. It was thus determined that the fence had little or no capability for 
stopping steel parts moving at high speed, and the screen itself posed an additional hazard to the 
facility. Therefore, the debris screen installation was abandoned. 
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Undesired Events and Risk Assessment 
The final step in the safety analysis and risk process (see Appendix C) is to formulate a list or 
table of undesired events/failure modes, and identify the effects or consequences of such events as 
well as establish safeguards to eliminate or to reduce the risks to acceptable levels. A summary of 
the primary undesired events and risk assessments is provided in table VI. 
As an example of an undesired event, consider the case when incorrect limits could be entered 
on the monitoring system (e.g. Boeing DRAS). In order to safeguard against this possibility, a 
special procedure and Facility Safety Head Approval Form was implemented for this test. This 
procedure required instrumentation and interlock check-out prior to each run and required both 
Boeing and NASA personnel to agree on load limit levels and to independently check the trip level 
settings. The special procedure forms used for the test are provided in Appendix D. 
Results and Discussion 
The results of the buffet test are presented in this section. Emphasis is placed on discussion of 
test techniques, experience and conditions under which buffet was encountered during the test. 
Reynolds Number Sweep With Vortex Generators Installed 
The first configuration tested had the vortex generators installed on the model. The test plan 
run profile shown in figure 3 was followed and testing began on January 18, 1991. During the 
initial phase of the testing, small angle-of-attack increments (Li 0.1 to 0.2°) and conservative 
limit amplitude (load) levels were used while monitoring the onboard accelerometers and strain 
gages. Several trips were initiated (either automatic or manual) during the early phases of the test 
until the model dynamics were characterized and acceptable levels of vibration were established, to 
avoid premature interlock trips. As the Reynolds number sweeps began, it became apparent that 
angle-of-attack would be limited to about 5 degrees due to pitch or stall buffet dynamics. Initial 
testing was slow due to the use of small angle-of-attack increments and the dwell time required 
for FFT analysis which developed amplitude or inverse amplitude () plots as angle-of-attack 
was slowly,
 increased. The test profile of figure 3 was completed without encountering roll buffet, 
with VG's on the model. An additional run at Mach .86 and 67 million/ft Reynolds number was 
completed, with VG's installed, without roll buffet onset. This initial test series was interrupted by 
the failure of the liquid nitrogen pump on 1/25/91. The pump was repaired at LaRC, and testing 
resumed on 2/13/91. 
Reynolds Number Sweep With Vortex Generators Removed 
The second series of tests with the vortex generators removed began at a Reynolds number 
of 49 million per foot since the clean wing configuration (without VG's) was tested previously in 
1988 at Re number of 7 and 35 million per foot without buffet encounter. Roll buffet was first 
observed for this series of tests at Re number of 59 million/ft at Mach .80. Subsequent testing at 
Mach .80 and 67.5 million/ft Re number and dynamic pressure of 2670 lb/ft 2
 resulted in a strong 
roll buffet response at c 4.5°. This test repeated the roll buffet encountered with the clean wing 
model at the same test conditions in 1988. The roll buffet (or buzz) amplitude was about 1 inch 
peak to peak at the wing tips and the frequency response was predominantly 20 Hz. These data 
clearly indicated that under roll buffet conditions the fuselage and swept strut were coming into 
contact (see figure 16) due to the yawing motion associated with the 20 Hz model response. The 
fouling occurred at about 80% of yawing moment full scale and is evident by signal clipping of the 
response peaks as shown in figure 16. The same type of signal clipping was observed during pre-test 
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dynamic load simulation (Appendix B) when fouling was visually observed and recorded as shown 
in figure 17. This fouling indication during testing was verified by inspection during tunnel entry 
for model change, and was subsequently monitored closely throughout the test program. 
Aeroelastic Stability Trends For Roil Buffet With and Without Vortex Generators 
An established technique for conducting flutter and buffet tests is to develop inverse amplitude 
() plots for the pertinent model frequency responses (FFT of time domain response) as tunnel 
parameters are varied (see ref. 3). In flutter testing, Mach number and dynamic pressure are 
normally varied to identify flutter boundaries. In the initial tests series in NTF for varying Re 
and q, Mach number was held constant at 0.8 and angle-of-attack was varied for the model with 
and without VG's. As a result, the primary variables affecting the buffet response onset and 
amplitude buildup were angle-of-attack and dynamic pressure. To evaluate trends toward buffet 
instability, RMS amplitudes were measured with the FFT Analyzer for the structural response 
modes of interest and the inverse of these amplitudes was plotted as a function of angle-of-attack 
and Reynolds number for constant Mach number. An example of a typical frequency response 
spectrum for the 767 model is given in figure 18. In the figure, the upper spectrum is for the left 
wing tip accelerometer in g's versus frequency. For the data shown, the predominant modes are 
at 10 Hz (1st sting bending mode); 20 Hz (roll/yaw mode) and 55 Hz (1st wing bending mode). 
The bottom graph illustrates the response as observed from the rolling moment output of the force 
balance. In this case, the predominant balance response frequency is 20 Hz as this channel cannot 
detect the structural modes response of the model support structure and the wing. 
The 1/amplitude plots for the 20 Hz mode response at Mach .8 and varying Reynolds number 
are illustrated in figures 19 and 20. Figure 19 gives the stability trends for the initial series of 
tests with the VG's installed on the model, while figure 20 gives similar results with VG's off the 
model. The condition for incipient instability is when - 0. As the slope of the curve tends to 
become steeper and shows a sharp trend toward zero, more data points must be taken at smaller 
angle-of-attack increments. 
In figure 19, the plots tend to break over at about 3.5° angle-of-attack. (This corresponds to a 
break in the CM and CL curve for the model). However, the plot shows that for the 20 Hz response, 
although increasing ( decreasing) up to 5 degrees, there is no sharp trend toward instability. As 
previously stated, roll buffet onset (lock-in) did not occur for these series of runs with the VG's 
installed. Also, as previously mentioned, these tests were limited to an angle-of-attack of 5 degrees 
due to onset of stall (pitch) buffet dynamics. 
Similar plots of the 1 stability index are given in figure 20 for varying Re number versus angle-
of-attack without VG's installed. The breakover point also occurs around 3 degrees angle-of-attack 
but with a much more rapid buildup in amplitude with increasing angle-of-attack. However, for a 
Re number of 49 million/ft and q of 1962 psf, the 20 Hz mode value decreased slightly between 
3.5° and 4.1° but became stable(tends toward increasing stability) with increasing angle-of-attack. 
However, at 59 and 67 million Reynolds number, buffet onset or lock-in is encountered and interlock 
trips initiated at fairly high (small ) amplitudes. As previously mentioned, because of fouling 
between the aft. model fuselage and swept strut support, attempts to further test into and possibly 
through the buffet region were abandoned due to risk of structural damage to the model and/or 
swept strut. Thus, it remains to be determined whether or not the model roll buffet is a limit cycle 
oscillation.
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An example of the roll buffet response, as seen from the time domain strip chart signal, is 
given in figure 21. The four channels of data shown in the figure include the yawing and rolling 
moment response as obtained from the balance and the swept strut bending and torsion strain 
gages response. When buffet onset and lock-in occurs, the frequency on all channels stabilizes in 
at 20 Hz with amplitude increasing rapidly. The buildup in amplitude to the interlock trip point 
for this case occurred in about 2 seconds. However, note the very rapid decay of the response from 
peak value to near zero in approximately 1/4 second. Since the tunnel Arc Sector pitch system 
moves about 3 degrees/second, the data suggests that only a very small change in a relieves the roll 
buffet lock-in oscillations. The interlock trip for the run shown in figure 21 was initiated manually 
by the engineer observing this strip chart data. 
Mach Number Sweep With and Without Vortex Generators 
After the roll buffet investigation was completed, the next phase of testing focused on obtaining 
aerodynamic data at a Reynolds number of 67 million/ft for varying Mach number with and without 
vortex generators installed. These tests were conducted in a normal testing mode, that is to say, 
polars were run at pre-established Mach numbers using normal angle-of-attack sweeps. The function 
of the team monitoring the dynamic and aeroelastic response would be to trip the interlocks if the 
pre-established buffet amplitudes were exceeded or roll buffet lock-in was encountered. Once the 
interlocks were tripped during a Mach number rim, the tunnel conditions were changed and the 
next Mach number run was initiated. It was expected that angle-of-attack would be limited by 
either roll buffet or pitch buffet, for all polars to be run. 
Mach Number Sweep With VG 's Installed. The initial run was made at Mach .86 and 
aerodynamic data were obtained up to 6.5° angle-of-attack. The interlock automatically tripped 
on the 55 Hz mode (1st wing bending) which is believed to be due to system stall response rather 
than wing flutter. Tests at Mach numbers .86, .84, .82 and .80 were limited by pitch buffet. These 
boundaries are plotted in figure 22. Roll buffet was encountered with VG's on at Mach numbers 
of 0.75 and 0.70 at angles-of-attack of 590 and 6.7°, respectively. These test results indicated that 
the VG's altered the flow over the wing such that roll buffet was not encountered at test Mach 
numbers greater than .75 but the pitch buffet boundary is about the same with or without VG's 
installed as can be seen in figure 22. 
Mach Number Sweep With VG's Removed. The initial runwas made at Mach .86 and data 
were obtained up to 6.25° angle-of-attack. This run was limited by a violent pitch buffet response 
which is discussed in the next section. Roll buffet was observed during the Mach 0.84 run but 
testing continued through this condition (vibration levels were within limits) to the point where 
the run was terminated due to pitch buffet at an angle of attack of approximately 6.6 0 . The 
remaining runs at Mach 0.82, 0.75, and 0.70 were limited by the roll buffet oscillations. 
Aeroelastic Stability Trends For Pitch or Stall Buffet 
As previously mentioned, pitch or stall buffet dynamics limited testing the model at high angles 
of attack. The pitch buffet boundary is illustrated in figure 22 for tests at full scale Reynolds 
number (67 million/ft). Buffet at high angles-of-attack is a common occurrence in wind tunnel 
testing. The problem is usually associated with flow separation over the wing at high angles-of-
attack resulting in unsteady aerodynamic loads on the model. Typically, the lowest fundamental 
model system structural mode in the pitch plane is excited (along with higher modes at lower 
energy) and amplitude is usually dynamic pressure dependent. High angle-of-attack buffet is not 
unique to the NTF. However, the loads associated with very high dynamic pressures (e.g. 767 tested 
at '-'2800 psf) can result in violent, high amplitude oscillations. 
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During the full scale Re number and Mach number sweeps with and without VG's attempts 
were made to get to the highest angle-of-attack possible without jeopardizing structural integrity 
of the model. The quality of the aerodynamic data was adversely affected when the model vibrated 
at high angles-of-attack. While testing at Mach 0.86 and 0.84 violent pitch oscillations were 
encountered at angles-of-attack of 6.4 and 6.0 degrees respectively. During the Mach .86 run 
the model oscillations were measured to be approximately 2.5 inches peak-to-peak at a frequency 
of 10 Hz, (1st model/sting bending mode in the pitch plane). At the peak amplitude the left wing 
inboard accelerometer and swept strut strain gage signals were lost. The peak pitch buffet response 
at Mach .86 as measured from the balance pitch, roll and normal force output and the bending 
gage on the swept strut is illustrated in figure 23. Note that the normal force response locks in at 
10 Hz while the pitching moment responds at 10 and 17 Hz (balance pitching mode). The signal 
from the swept strut bending gage was lost. After disassembly of the model, it was found that 
the swept strut strain gage wires were severed due to fouling between the bottom of the swept 
strut and the bottom of the model fuselage. Figure 23 shows that after the interlock is tripped, 
the motion is completely decayed in approximately one second. Although the pitch or stall buffet 
oscillations were violent, the model and support system (sting) were not in jeopardy as the stresses 
(both combined static and dynamic) were within acceptable limits. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Buffet testing of the Boeing 767 wind tunnel model was successfully completed in the National 
Transonic Facility at the NASA Langley Research Center. A comprehensive safety analysis and risk 
assessment program was carried out by Boeing and NASA personnel, as a prerequisite for testing in 
the NTF facility. On-line dynamic signal monitoring of on-board instrumentation and wind tunnel 
interlocks were successfully used to protect the model system. Buffet boundaries were established 
at various Mach numbers and angles-of-attack at full scale Reynolds number. Pitch or stall buffet 
limited testing to a maximum angle-of-attack of 6.5 degrees. Testing into the roll buffet region was 
limited due to fouling between the model fuselage and swept strut support sting. Test techniques 
employed were based on those used by Boeing and NASA LaRC for testing flutter models. 
This test is expected to serve as the model for future aeroelastic tests in the National Transonic 
Facility. Buffet of wind tunnel models is expected to be a continuing problem when testing in the 
NTF, at full scale Reynolds numbers and associated high dynamic pressures. It is recommended 
that pre-entry assessment of the potential for buffet should be made for each model to the tested 
in the NTF. Also, provisions should be made for instrumenting potentially high risk cryogenic test 
models with accelerometers or strain gages placed at strategic locations to monitor and protect the 
model structure against dynamic and/or aeroelastic response overloads. 
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Appendix A 
Specifications, Calibration Test Sequence and Measured Sensitivities 
For Accelerometers Used For 767 Test Program 
Specifications for the PCB quartz accelerometers used for the Boeing 767 test program are 
available from the manufacturer. These miniature accelerometers are about the size of a pencil 
eraser (.23 in. diameter x .30 in. high) and were tested extensively at the NASA Langley Research 
Center. The Model No. of the accelerometers used is the 309M42: which has a different type 
of connecting wire than the 309M15. The accelerometer calibration test sequence is provided in 
Figure A-i. The test sequence is designed to characterize a cryogenic test profile for the NTF. 
Accelerometer sensitivities at low temperatures for four of the units are provided in figure A2. 
The data of figure A-2 were used to select the sensitivity at test temperature for signal calibration. 
Note that sensitivity curves slopes are fairly fiat for the left wing outboard and right wing nacelle 
accelerometers at —250°F (test temperature). The accelerometers performed very well during the 
tests. Drop out of accelerometer signals occurred twice during the test and both were attributed to 
wire breakage due to thermal and/or mechanical loading. Care must be taken to install the wires 
to prevent fraying across sharp edges and allow enough slack for wire contraction. 
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Appendix B 
Description of Pre-.test Checkout For Dynamic Monitoring and Safety Shutdown 
Systems 
Background 
This test was conducted to check out the dynamic monitoring and safety shutdown systems 
that were to be used for conducting the Boeing 767 model buffet test in the NASA Langley National 
Transonic Facility. The test(s) verified operation of monitoring equipment and instrumentation; and 
was used to simulate model system dynamic response expected during the actual wind-tunnel test. 
Also, the systems to be used for automatic emergency shutdown of the facility were functionally 
checked. These included the Boeing DRAS 1 system and the Langley Critical Point Analyzer 
(CPA).. The Boeing DRAS system was used to guard against overload of the Boeing 767 model, 
structure (excluding the force balance).. The Critical Point Analyzer (CPA) was used to protect 
the balance and support sting swept strut against dynamic overload. 
Test Apparatus 
The test setup is given in figure 10. The vibration shaker used was an Electro-Seis, model 113LZ 
with a 30-pound maximum input force capability and 6 inch stroke. The shaker was attached to 
a wooden support frame that sat on the test section floor (see figure 12). This set-up provided a 
semi-rigid base for mounting the vibration exciter (shaker). 
Test Procedure 
The test procedure was designed to simulate anticipated model system dynamic response during 
the actual wind-tunnel test. The shaker was attached to designated hard points on the model and 
forcing function loads and frequencies established for exciting specified vibration modes. 
The test was conducted in the following manner: 
1. The shaker was attached to the model at hard points on the right wing outboard flap track 
fairing and at a forward point on the fuselage centerline. Note: Provision was made for a 
threaded rod attachment to the outboard flap track fairing. An adapter rod and threaded bolt 
was used for the fuselage attachment. The shaker was mounted on the wooden support base 
provided by NTF. 
2. All available monitoring system equipment and model instrumentation was active during the 
forced vibration testing. Vibration test engineers were in voice communication with the test 
director and/or monitoring equipment operators in the control room, during the test(s). 
3. Specified modes were excited to the highest levels possible without exceeding preestablished 
load or displacement limits established by Boeing and/or NASA. 
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4. Modes excited for these tests were: 
Symmetric 
Mode #
	
Mode	 Measured Freq., Hz 
1	 1st Sting Bending	 10-11 
2	 Rigid Model Pitching on Balance 	 17 
3	 1st Wing Bending	 55 
Anti-Symmetric 
1	 Rigid Model Rolling and Yawing on Balance 	 19 
2	 Rigid Model Rolling on Balance 	 23 
3	 First Wing Bending	 •.	 77 
Primary emphasis was placed on exciting the 19 and 23 Hz roll modes (anti-symmetric) to 
approximately 1 inch peak-to-peak at the wing tip. Wing bending modes are also excited but 
at very low levels. 
5. During the forced vibration testing, the model system instrumentation output was recorded 
on the NASA 14-channel tape recorder, and monitored real-time by Langley personnel. The 
following monitoring equipment was used: 
Boeing 
- DRAS Unit No. 1 
NASA 
- BDDU 
—CPA 
- TDT 0-Graph & FFT Analyzer 
- NTF FFT Analyzer 
6. The forced vibration response test accomplished the following objectives. 
A. Verified monitoring equipment and instrumentation operation. 
B. Correlated measured, response with 
1) Input Forcing Function 
2) Balance (BDDU response) with accelerometer/strain gage(s) response on wings and 
support sting. (Note: The results of this study could have had a bearing on decisions 
related to continuation of testing if one or more accelerometers had been permanently 
lost during the wind-tunnel, test.)
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C. The forced vibration testing was used to check the function of the model safety and 
shutdown systems. This was done by setting trip levels (and frequencies as appropriate) 
on the DRAS 1 unit and the CPA that were detected from the forced vibration loads. 
Shutdown commands to appropriate visual and/or audible alarms were verified, and tunnel 
interlocks signal transmission verified. 
D. Data taken from the BDDU yaw moment dynamic response were used to characterize the 
dynamic signal response and establish the % full scale value at which fouling occurred 
between the fuselage and swept strut when forcing the model at -'20 Hz in roll. 
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Appendix C

Safety/Risk Assessment Model Used For

Boeing 767 Buffet Test in NTF 
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Appendix D

Special Procedure For Model Protection

Interlock Variable Inputs 
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Special Procedure
Model Protection Interlock Variable Inputs

Boeing 767 Test #038 
Purpose: The purpose of this procedure is to provide a series of 
checklist items that will be approved by the Facility Safety Head 
prior to operating the tunnel. The checklist items are for the 
safe management of instrumentation interlock variable inputs that 
are critical to protecting the structural integrity of the test 
model and the model support system. Prior to each new run where a 
variable (limit) change is required or to reset s ystem after an 
interlock trip, the following checklist will be used. The test 
director will be responsible for tracking variable input changes 
throughout the test program and interlock tri p conditions. 
Objective: The objective of this procedure is to ensure that in-
terlock limits defined as variable inputs are properly maintained 
and correctly entered into the proper instrumentation device(s) 
figure 1. The instrumentation devices are the critical components 
for sensing (automatic/visual) model buffeting boundaries and in-
itiating the appropriate interlock actions. Incorrect variable 
input entries may result in model/support system failure and tun-
nel damage as identified in the NTF/Boeing 767 Safety Analysis 
Review. 
Scope: Prior to running a selected test condition, (Mach Number, 
Reynolds Number {Re} and Dynamic Pressure {Q}), the test director 
will review the' need to change interlock variables and/or verify 
the current variable inputs (no changes from the last checklist 
sign-off). Any discrepancies or input changes are to be docu-
mented and/or changed via this special procedure. 
Seven (7) stations have been identified as noted on Figure 2. 
Each station will have an assigned personwho is responsible for 
equipment operation, calibration and variable (limit) input. 
Each assigned person(s) will sign off the indicated items on this 
checklist. 
Procedure Approved: Rev. A 
FSH: 
FC:
28
Model Protection Interlock Checklist 
Variable Inputs 
Date:  
Time:
Test Condition 
Run -Mach _Re
	
0 (psf) U/mv Trip
 Reset 
STATION 1: Assigned to:
 
1.1 DRAS #1
	 Channel 1 Channel 2 NASA/Boeing 
Trip Level Millivolts Pk
 
Maximun Freq-HZ  
Flutter Freq-HZ
 
No. Events 
Relay Enable 
Power 
1.2 DRAS #2
	 Channel 1 Channel 2 
Trip Level Millivolts Pk
 
Max imun Freq-HZ
 
Flutter Freq-HZ
 
No. Events 
Interlocks Checked
 
Power 
1.3 WATERFALL  
1.4 WATERFALL (Slave)
 
STATION 2: Assigned to
 
2.1 FFT 
Wing  
Strut  
Balance 
2.2 FFT (All Channels)  
STATION 3: Assigned to___________ 
3.	 TV Monitors  
29
Model Protection Interlock Checklist

Variable Inputs 
STATION 4: Assigned to
 
4.1 Tape Recorder  
4.2 Power Supplies  
4.3 Gain Settings/Voice Record  
4.4 Technician Available 
STATION 5: CPA Assigned to___________ 
5.1	 Normal Axial Pitch Roll	 Yaw	 Side 
Chl 08 13 _14_ _17_ 35 14  
Ch2 38 00 42 00 09 10  
Ch3 51 00 _24_ 00 18 07  
Ch4 47 00 _25_ _08_ 07 14  
Ch5 58 00 07 03 03 29  
Ch6 00 00 00 19 14 67
5.2 Power - On 
5.3 Mode - Scan  
5.4 Dynamic Interlock - Checked\on  
STATION 6: BDDU Assigned to  
6.1 Set Up per RIOP-20  
6.2 Ocilliscope (Yaw Moment) 
for Monitoring Model Fouling (+20% = 100% ALARM)  
STATION 7: Test Director Console 
CAUTION 
Ensure correct sign is entered
for "Pitch Home" setpoint. 
7.1 Pitch Home Setpoint U/mv  
7.2 Pitch - Armed  
7.3 Reset Model Protection 	 (FSH)  
7.4 Model Roll @ 0 Deg. & Red Tagged  
Test Director/Date  
Facility Safety Head Approval/Date  
Comments/Notes:
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TABLE II. SUMMARY OF MEASURED MODEL

SYSTEM PRIMARY STRUCTURAL MODES AND FREQUENCIES 
Mode Description	 Frequency, Hz 
Sting Bending (Yaw Plane) 5.8 
Sting Bending (Pitch Plane) 11 
Pitch Motion (Balance) 17 
Roll/Yaw (Balance) 19 
Roll 23 
Wing Bending (1st Mode Sym.) 55 
Wing Bending (1st Mode Asym.) 77 
TABLE III. CRITICAL LOADING/

FAILURE LOCATIONS FOR VARIOUS VIBRATION MODES 
Mode 
20 Hz Roll 
55 Hz Bending 
1st Wing (Sym) 
1st Wing (Asym) 
Loose Fasteners 
Other Vibrations
Critical Area 
Wing © Sta 9.30 Aft Fastener Hole 
Wing © Sta 9.30 Aft Fastener Hole 
Wing © Sta 9.30 Aft Fastener Hole 
Wing © Sta 9.30 Aft Fastener Hole 
Wing, Horizontal, Nacelles 
Upper Swept Strut Blade 
TABLE W. WING STRESS CALCULATIONS (NORMALIZED) 
Stress © Maximum Wing Tip 
Loading Mode Nacelle Hole Stress Deflection 100 G 
Air (2700 Q) 30555 (73332) 45343 N/A 
Air + 100 Gs © 20 Hz 42000 (108000) 67553 5.5 " 
Air + 100 Gs © 50 Hz 50555 (121332) 81887 .88" 
Air .+ 100 Gs © 84 Hz 36050 (86520) 61545 .32" 
Air + 100 Gs © 86 Hz 35120 (84288) 56645 .31"
34 
TABLE V. SUMMARY OF CRITICAL MODEL

COMPONENTS, FACTORS OF SAFETY, AND FAILURE ACCEPTABILITY

FOR 20 Hz ROLL MODE - 100 g's AT WING TIP 
Component	 Static & Dynamic Stress Level/F
	
Failure 
.S. - Acceptable? 
Wing 73332 108000 /2.38 Horizontal Tail 79688 97089 /2.60 Nacelle & Strut 17310 28043 /4.85 Sting (Blade) 50097 71305 /3.50 Balance Adaptor 97328 97330 - /2.60 Body 10703 18524 /13.5 Flap Track Fairing Assy <1200 12000 /20.8 Wing Bolts 1429 LBF 3261 LBF /2.7 Nacelle Bolts 152 LBF 246 LBF /3.35 Horizontal Bolts 1476 LBF 3228 LBF /2.38 Vortex Generators Low Low Balance 31462 In-lb 350% Overload
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
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TEST SECTION
_____ 
ACCELEROMETER'S
	
AOA INTERNAL
	
ARC 
- 
EXTERNAL
	 STRAINS
	
t4\7SECTOR 
BALANCE 
EXCITER 
VIBRATION 
fl
\ - ACCELEROMETER'S INTERNAL 
INTERNAL 
ANALOG SIGNAL CONDITIONING 
TAPE RECORDER 
DYNAMIC LOADS MONITORING AND 
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM 
CONTROL ROOM 
Figure 11. - Setup for Dynamic Loads Monitoring and Shutdown 
Systems Checkout. 
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Figure 14.- Finite Element Model of Pure Roll Mode. (20 HZ) 
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Figure 15. - Finite Element Model of First Wing Bending Symmetric 
Mode. (55 HZ)
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767 Test 101B Balance -Shaking Model 10 Jan 1991 
Plot of Yaw & Side Balance Channels 
Fouling Indications'
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Figure 17. - Balance Yaw Moment and Side Force Response from 
Forced Vibration Tests Illustrating Fouling Between Aft 
Fuselage and Swept Strut. 
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